Thesis: The Bengal Famine of 1943 was caused by several natural and man-made factors. Although the natural elements, such as low rainfall, cyclone and pest infestation played a major role, the Bengal Famine’s main contributor were the poor governmental policies employed by the British Empire. The British government exploited the area, hesitated in providing aid upon discovering the approaching famine and employed policies which resulted in low inter-provincial trade, the hoarding of food by merchants and producers and ultimately a low supply of food within the province. 

Introduction

There are two main theories regarding the causes of a famine. The first theory asserts that the main cause of a famine is Food Availability Decline. This theory has been championed by Thomas Malthus. He believed that famines are caused when the population exceeds the ability of the land to sustain it and are hence a control measure for the population. This is known as the Malthusian Doctrine, and it was an official assumption of the British Empire (Tharoor, 2017).  The opposing view is led by Amartya Sen which states that famines are mainly caused by human economic relations and political actions (Tauger, 2003). Sen believed that the Bengal Famine was caused due to market failure in a wartime context. In agreement with Sen, this essay asserts that the British Empire had sufficient resources in 1943 and the Bengal Famine was ultimately caused by poor economic and governmental policies. 

A recent study of soil moisture conducted by Vimal Mishra and colleagues looked at all the famines in India between 1870 and 2016 and found that the Bengal Famine is the only one which is not preceded by a drought. They stated that Bengal received more rain than usual between June – September 1943; with 15% more in June, 3% in July, 9% in August and 4% in September. They concluded their results as follows, “We find that the Bengal famine was likely caused by other factors related at least in part to the ongoing Asian threat of World War II including malaria, starvation and malnutrition (Vimal Mishra, 2019).”

The following map of Bengal shows the famine affected areas: 

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Source: (Gráda, 2015)

The Exploitation of Bengal

Bengal was a rich and self-sustaining province before the British rule. When General Robert Clive conquered Bengal for the British Empire, he described it as “the paradise of the earth”. In late 1665, the physician Francois Bernier travelled through Bengal and described it as “the finest and most fruitful country in the world (Bernier, 1668 ).” The city was rich in resources and foreign traders had nothing to offer the local shop owners besides silver. Bengal exported rice to Sri Lanka and the Maldives, sugar to Arabia and Mesopotamia and silk to Europe. It also exported wheat biscuits, salted meats, opium, varnish, wax, musk, spices, preserved fruits, cotton and clarified butter. As the Mogul Empire deteriorated, Clive attained the rights of collecting revenue from Bengal. They changed taxing policies, were strict in collection and provided very little aid to the struggling farmers. Within five years due to strict taxing policies and famine, Bengal became one of India’s poorest province (Mukerjee, 2010). 

In the mid-nineteen hundreds, India and Bengal were expected to support the war effort on behalf of Britain. Not only was India providing soldiers and natural resources, the British government was carelessly borrowing money from the Indian treasury without any realistic plan of paying it back. India no longer owed the British empire any money. On the contrary, the empire borrowed about a million pounds a day. India was also providing 30,000 tonnes of rice to Sri Lanka a month until 1942, which was later reduced to 12,000. India only stopped exporting food in the July of 1943  (Mukerjee, 2010). With military advice, they also removed rice and paddy from Midnapur Bakerganj and Khulna as it was considered excess to Bengal’s requirement (Gráda, 2015). 

Priorities

The British empire held firm to three ideological values regarding famines. (1) They firmly believed in the Malthusian Doctrine which prevented them from sympathizing with the struggling Indians. Their second principle was to refrain from interfering with the free market, which made them reluctan in maintaining the market price of grain by sending aid and forcing out hoarded stock. Their third value was to be prudent while sending financial aid. This prevented them from sending sufficient aid until it was too late (Tharoor, 2017). Additionally, many of the officials felt that the requests of aid were merely a ploy to extort resources from Britain. The diary of Leopard S. Amery, the state secretary of India, often recounts discussions where such sentiments were shared within the British War Cabinet (Mukerjee, 2010). 

The British government would often justify its lack of aid due to the lack of boats available for sending aid to India. But in the fall of 1943, British ships were passing by India with boats filled with wheat. The British had decided to store wheat for Greece and Yugoslavia that they were hoping to liberate. This wheat would be exported from Australia and would pass by India but was not used to relieve the famine struck populace. Additionally, shipping situations were ideal in 1943. The War Against U-Boats had been won, and American ship production was at an all-time high. The allies had numerous ships, and the United States had even placed an additional fifteen to twenty cargo ships under Britain control. What was once known as the British Shipping Crisis was labelled as a ‘shipping glut’ by historian Kevin Smith for this era. However, prime minister Winston Churchill commanded these ships to fill the stockpiles of UK and to restore white bread within the nation. These ships were also used to accumulate a second stockpile in the Mediterranean for when the British conquer the Balkans (Mukerjee, 2010). 

British Policies That Contributed to The Famine

Before the famine reached its climax, the British government had many opportunities to provide aid to Bengal. A sufficient shipment of aid could bring down prices and encourage people to let go of hoarded stock. In December 1942, Viceroy Linlithgow, the viceroy of India, asked the empire to send 600,000 tonnes of wheat. More specifically, on January 2, 1943, Governor Herbert warned viceroy Linlithgow that Bengal requires about 18,000 tonnes of wheat a month, and they have fallen short of over twice this amount in the last quarter. Instead of sending aid, a few days later, the British empire cut down all their ships in the Indian Ocean area. A few boats were left with the exclusive purpose of taking exports from India to Britain. By July 1943, the empire only sent 30,000 tonnes of wheat. This included a shipment of 26,000 tonnes from Australia which was originally intended to be sent regularly, but the empire later decided to direct all such shipments straight to the UK for its own stockpile. Due to reduced aid, the viceroy could only deliver a quarter of the aid that he had originally promised Bengal. This lead the people to lose trust in the government for relief for the future, and merchants and producers started hoarding their stocks, which further drew up prices and reduced available food in the market (Mukerjee, 2010). 

The British War Cabinet met to discuss Viceroy Linlithgow’s request for aid and declined his request. They felt that the main cause of the famine was hoarding and decided to pursue a propaganda of denying the existence of an upcoming famine. Secretary Leopard Amery stated in January 1943 in the House of Commons, “There is no famine and no widespread prevalence of acute shortage.” His public stance remained the same, even in July, as he claimed “[There is] no overall shortage of food grains. (Gráda, 2015)” When aid was not sent to India, the Indian government did not explain to the Bengal government the reason for the lack of supplies. Instead they were told that the province had more than sufficient amount of rice. Justice Henry B. L. Braund of Bengal’s Department of Civil Supplies says that he was told by the federal government in March 1943, “This shortage is a thing entirely of your imagination.” Major General E. Wood from New Delhi’s Department of Food instructed Pinnell, a Bengal civil servant, “preach the gospel of sufficiency”. Huseyn Shaheed Shurawardy was appointed as food minister of Bengal. Even though he knew that a famine was approaching, he was not permitted by the Indian government to declare it. He continued announcing that the province faced no shortages. Unfortunately, this strategy was quite ineffective in loosening private stockpiles. Instead, it kept the people of Bengal in ignorance regarding the approaching crisis and prevented any substantial famine relief efforts from being formed. This policy also stopped the Bengal government from asking for aid externally. Much of the world was not aware of the situation until the famine was at its heights (Mukerjee, 2010). 

Several British policies also reduced the food available in Bengal. In 1940, the Jute Regulation Act required 5.4 million acres of land in Bengal to be used in jute production. 2.7 million acres of this land was previously used as rice fields (Mukerjee, 2010) but was being used for producing jute as of 1940. Additionally, there was a threat of a Japanese attack. The British destroyed any boats that could carry more than ten passengers in fear that they may be used by enemy combatants. This rule significantly hurt the fishing and the boating industry of Bengal, reducing food supply and raising transportation costs (Gráda, 2015). They also felt that India was too big to enforce federal regulatory laws. Therefore, they made each province in charge of regulating their own prices and food supply. This limited inter-provincial trade, as provinces became more concerned about retaining their own resources. Provinces that had a surplus of food were hesitant to share their supplies with Bengal due to this policy (Mukerjee, 2010). 

Conclusion

Natural causes were undoubtedly factors of the Bengal famine of 1943. However, if the British had given more priority to the Indian population, sent sufficient aid and adopted regulatory practices the casualties of the Bengal Famine could have greatly been reduced. 

Bibliography

Bernier, F. (1668 ). Travels In The Mogul Empire. New York: Oxford University Press.

Gráda, C. Ó. (2015). Eating People Is Wrong and Other Essays on Famine Its Past and Its Future. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Mukerjee, M. (2010). Churchill’s Secret War: The British Empire and the Ravaging of India during World War II. New York: Basic Books.

Tauger, M. B. (2003). Entitlement, Shortage and the 1943 Bengal Famine: Another Look. The Journal of Peasant Studies, 31(1), 45-72.

Tharoor, S. (2017). Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India. London: C. Hurst & Co.

Vimal Mishra, A. D. (2019). Drought and Famine in India, 1870–2016. Geophysical Research Studies, 46(4), 2017-2083.

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